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Abstract
Tableaux originate as a decision method for a logical language.
They can also be extended to obtain a structure that spells out all the
information in a set of sentences in terms of truth value assignments to
atomic formulas that appear in them. This approach is pursued here.
Over such a structure, compositional rules are provided for obtaining
the presuppositions of a logical statement from its atomic subformu-
las and their presuppositions. The rules are based on classical logic
semantics and they are shown to model the behaviour of presuppo-
sitions observed in natural language sentences built with if . . . then,
and and or. The advantages of this method over existing frameworks
for presuppositions are discussed.
Keywords: presupposition, compositionality, tableaux, natural language
representation.
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1 The Problem of Compositionality for Pre-
suppositions
This work is concerned with the problems of adding the concept of presuppo-
sition to a logical language. Although presupposition originates as a natural
language phenomenon, for the purposes of the present work sentences will be
represented as propositions of a logical language. At this level of granularity,
presupposition can simply be represented as a relation between sentences.
For instance, the sentence The typewriter is working can be said to presup-
pose: There is a typewriter.
Presupposition has the additional property (often used to characterize it)
that the negation of a sentence has the same presuppositions as the sentence
itself. For example, the sentence The typewriter is not working has the same
presupposition as its positive counterpart given above (namely, that there is
a typewriter). The reader is referred to the literature on presupposition for
a wider analysis of the implications of this property 1.
A formal language has the property of compositionality if it is possible
to describe the meaning of a complex expression of the language in terms
of the meaning of its parts. It is considered a desired property for any
formal language. When a logical statement is composed from propositions
that presuppose other propositions, it should be possible to describe the
presuppositions of the resulting complex expression in terms of its parts and
the presuppositions of its parts. If one takes the natural language connectives
if . . . then , and , and or to be related to material conditional, conjunction,
and disjunction, natural language examples provide some clues as to what the
behaviour of presupposition should be. Sentences (1), (2) and (3) presuppose
There is a typewriter; while sentences (4), (5) and (6) do not.
(1) If the typewriter is blue then Sue will be happy.
(2) If you are in Sue’s office then the typewriter is blue.
1The most important consequence is that attempts to model presupposition as an en-
tailment lead to characterizations where all presuppositions are tautologies in the classical
sense, which is an undesirable result. This is based on the argument that if α ⊢ β and
¬α ⊢ β then it must be the case that ⊢ β. Because presuppositions are observed to be
informative in their actual use by language speakers, this way of modelling them is not
useful.
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(3) Either the typewriter is blue or the chair is.
(4) If there is a typewriter then the typewriter is blue.
(5) Either there isn’t a typewriter or the typewriter is blue.
(6) Either the typewriter is blue or there isn’t a typewriter.
The behaviour of presuppositions of sentences of this form has tradition-
ally been studied as part of the projection problem for presuppositions, which
is concerned with describing the presuppositions of a sentence in terms of the
presuppositions of its subordinate clauses. The constructions considered in
the projection problem involve nested subordination (verbs of propositional
attitude, factive verbs) beyond the natural language connectives treated here.
2 Previous Work
The framework presented in this work is compared with three other ap-
proaches.
Beaver [1, 2] presents a solution based on update semantics. This account
originates from an approach to the projection problem that concentrates on
how the presuppositions of a compound sentence are obtained from the pre-
suppositions of its components (Karttunen [9, 10], Karttunen and Peters
[11] and Heim [7, 8]). The projection problem is rephrased in terms of what
it takes for a context (represented as a set of possible worlds) to satisfy a
presupposition. This question is answered by defining for each connective
updates of compounds in terms of sequences of simpler updates that involve
only their components. However, there are several problems: no satisfactory
account for the behaviour of disjunction is provided; the defeasibility of pre-
suppositions is not addressed; and presupposition as an informative operation
is only allowed as a repairing modification to the original framework.
Mercer [12, 13] applies a default logic approach. This account originates
from an approach to the projection problem that concentrates on how pre-
supposition as an inference is defeated when inconsistent with more firmly
established information (Gazdar [4, 5]). Presuppositions (of negative sen-
tences) are represented as normal defaults. Mercer’s method follows Gazdar
in taking into account the internal structure of sentences only in terms of
Gricean pragmatic implicatures of the sentence. In order to avoid excessive
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production of presuppositions, Mercer needs to take into account that an
assertion of α ∨ β or α → β carries with it the assumption that the speaker
does not know α,¬α, β, or ¬β, that is, that he considers an information state
where all of them are open possibilities. The consistency checks required for
defaults must consider these implicatures. The method obscures the issue
of how the compositionality for truth values and the compositionality for
presupposition are related.
There is an alternative approach (van der Sandt [14]) within the frame-
work of DRT. This approach considers presupposition as anaphora. In this
approach, interpretation of presupposition is reformulated as a search for an
anaphoric referent. This solution is essentially linguistic. It captures an es-
sential aspect of the nature of presupposition (its anaphoric nature), but it
fails to address its direct relation with the semantics required for interpreting
these connectives in a logical sense.
3 The Tableau Interpretation
3.1 The Basic Framework
Where language is simplified to a set of sentences so that the internal con-
struction of each sentence does not play a role, the representation of pre-
supposition can be restricted to defining the ordered pairs of sentences for
which this relationship holds. I assume that such a relation of presupposing
is given for the atomic formulas of the language. To make this information
conspicuous without introducing too many definitions, I notate the fact that
‘α presupposes β ’ by writing each instance of α as αβ.
In terms of this notation, the behaviour of presupposition concerning
negation has the following implication: ¬(αβ) ≡ (¬α)β (For simplicity, I
leave out the parentheses in these cases from now on.)
For complex sentences the relation of presupposing has to be worked
out, ideally in a compositional way. This is achieved in the next section by
defining rules that govern the compositionality. In order to obtain a simpler
formulation of these rules, a specific representation of the logical structure of
the connectives is required. This representation is described in the present
section.
The logical connectives I am considering have their own definition of
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compositionality with respect to truth value. In the present framework, these
definitions are represented as tableaux expansion rules.
Tableau expansion rules:
¬ − rules)
¬¬φ
φ
α− rules)
α1 ∧ α2
α1
α2
¬(α1 → α2)
α1
¬α2
¬(α1 ∨ α2)
¬α1
¬α2
β − rules)
β1 ∨ β2
β1 ¬β1 β1
β2 β2 ¬β2
β1 → β2
¬β1 ¬β1 β1
β2 ¬β2 β2
¬(β1 ∧ β2)
¬β1 ¬β1 β1
¬β2 β2 ¬β2
Classical negation operates over the language wherever reasoning about
negated sentences is required.
Some additional definitions are needed to introduce this way of under-
standing the representation. Apart from the expansion rules, these defini-
tions follow existing tableau frameworks for propositional logic. They include
definitions of: a tableau, a branch of a tableau, branch closure, and closure
for a tableau. (For standard definitions, see Fitting [3]).
3.2 Coverage Property
The definition of tableau expansion rules ensures that these tableau obey a
special property.
Coverage Property:
If one branch of a tableau holds a sentence δ, then every (open)
branch of that tableau will hold either δ or ¬δ.
This property can be seen to hold: 1) it applies to each one of the expan-
sion rules, 2) the procedure for adding sentences to a tableau is defined in
terms of adding the new sentence to every (open) branch (and then applying
the expansion rules to it).
A consequence of this property in terms of the semantics, is that each
branch of the tableau contains a complete atomic truth-value assignment that
makes the sentence true. The structures that result are equivalent to classical
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truth tables. A tableau formulation is retained in spite of this fact because
it takes into account that lines of the truth table that become inconsistent
as more information is added are dropped out of the reckoning (as an effect
of branch closure).
3.3 The Formalism as a Decision Method for the Logic
The present framework differs from traditional tableaux only in the definition
of β expansion rules. The traditional definition of β expansion rules is not
suitable for presupposition because it specifies the alternatives in the minimal
form that preserves soundness and completeness of the logical calculus. This
is done in order to simplify the computation of logical consequences. The
information that is not specified explicitly as a result of this policy does not
affect logical consequences, but it is relevant to presupposition behaviour as
described by the compositionality rules given here.
The tableaux given here (presuppositional tableaux or PT) can be used as
a decision method in the same way as traditional tableaux (semantic tableaux
or ST). A simple way of showing this may be to show that PT tableau are
equivalent to ST tableaux. Given that the definitions of tableau, tableau
for a set of sentences, closure, proof and refutation are the same in the PT
framework as in ST tableaux, the discussion concerns only the expansion
rules. Of these, only β-rules differ from one framework to the other. It is
enough to show that under the circumstances under which ST tableau for
a β-formula becomes closed, the PT tableau for the same β-formula also
becomes closed (and viceversa).
4 Compositionality of Presupposition over Log-
ical Connectives
4.1 Compositionality Rules for Presupposition
Over the representation of the logical language given in the previous section,
compositionality of presupposition can be defined.
Two issues need to be dealt with: 1) how the presuppositions of a branch
are ascertained from the presuppositions of the atomic propositions in it, and
2) how the presuppositions of branches of the same tableau interact.
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I notate a branch as ∆. I use β ∈ ∆ as shorthand for ‘the proposition
β appears in the branch ∆. The notation for presupposition is extended to
branches so that ∆β stands for ‘the branch ∆ presupposes β’.
The compositionality rules for presupposition do not take into account
presuppositional information from branches of a tableau that are closed.
Rule 1
For an open branch ∆ such that αβ ∈ ∆, ∆β unless i) ¬β ∈ ∆,
or ii) β ∈ ∆, or iii) there is some δ¬β ∈ ∆.
Rule 2
For a tableau Γ with at least one open branch ∆, Γβ iff ∆β.
The determination of presuppositions of a branch is handled in a simple
way by considering that presupposition is weaker than assertion, so that
it survives only in cases where it does not overlap or clash with any other
information. Conditions 1.i and 1.ii capture the intuitive observation that
presupposition is only informative when it concerns a proposition that does
not appear in any literal already in the branch. Condition 1.iii allows the
presuppositions of a branch to survive only when there is no conflict between
them.
The interaction between presuppositions of different branches can be
shown to be trivial in the present framework by application of the Coverage
Property. By the Coverage Property, different branches wil have the same
atomic propositions and they will differ only in that each atomic proposi-
tion may appear negated in one branch and appear unnegated in another.
In terms of Rule 1, these differences would affect only α and δ as possible
origins of presuppositions and β in conditions i) and ii). Because the relation
of presupposing is given for atomic propositions, if δ¬β in one branch, it is
not possible to have δβ in a different branch. The results of applying rule 1
are the same when any of these propositions is exchanged for its negation2.
This can be used to show that if a tableau has a branch that presupposes a
proposition, then every branch of the tableau will presuppose that proposi-
tion. Conversely, if a tableau has a (open) branch that does not presuppose a
proposition, then no branch of the tableau will presuppose that proposition.
2 For α and δ, the negated and the unnegated version have the same presupppositions;
for β, substituting with the negation is equivalent to interchanging conditions i) and ii).
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4.2 Simple Sentences
I give the first few examples in detail to show how the rules operate.
Example (1) is a case of behaviour of presuppositions originating in the
antecedent of a conditional. Sentence (1) If the typewriter is blue then Sue
will be happy corresponds to the following representation.
αβ → γ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬αβ ¬αβ αβ
γ ¬γ γ
By application of rule 1, every one of the alternatives presupposes β.
None of the conditions holds for any branch. By application of rule 2 to
any one of them, β is obtained as a presupposition of the compound. This
matches expected behaviour.
The sentence (7) Bill regrets that there is no hot water left presupposes
(8) There is no hot water left. The problem is to determine what the presup-
positions are for sentence (9) If Mary has had a bath, then Bill regrets that
there is no hot water left. Assume sentence (9) has the form α → δβ. The
representation for this sentence in this framework would be:
α→ δβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬α ¬α α
δβ ¬δβ δβ
Application of the rules predicts a presupposition β for the sentence.
Example (4) is a case of behaviour of presuppositions originating in the
consequent of a conditional, in the particular case where the presupposition
itself forms the antecedent. Sentence (4) If there is a typewriter then the
typewriter is blue corresponds to the following representation.
β → αβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬β ¬β β
αβ ¬αβ αβ
By rule 1, none of the alternatives under the compound presuppose β
(condition 1.i holds for the first two columns, condition 1.ii holds for the third
one). This agrees with the intuitive behaviour that had to be modelled.
Disjunction presented the most problems in update semantics attempts
to model intuitive behaviour in terms of compositionality. Example (5) Ei-
ther there isn’t a typewriter or the typewriter is blue shows the case where
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the presuppositions of one of the disjuncts are not presuppositions of the
disjunction. This sentence corresponds to a structure that is equivalent to
that for the conditional of example (4), and gives no presupposition for the
compound. This matches the required behaviour.
Unlike update semantics methods, this approach can also handle the sym-
metrical version of the disjunct with no problems. For the sentence in ex-
ample (6) Either the typewriter is blue or there isn’t a typewriter the corre-
sponding expansion contains the same literals in each branch but in a different
order. Since order in the branch plays no role in the compositionality rules3,
the predictions are the same as for the previous case.
The method can also handle the case of disjunctions with contradictory
presuppositions. Take for instance the sentence in example (10) Either Bill
has started smoking or Bill has stopped smoking. This has the following
representation:
δ¬β ∨ αβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ¬β δ¬β ¬δ¬β
αβ ¬αβ αβ
In this case, the method predicts (condition 1.iii) no presupposition for
any column. Application of rule 2 gives no presupposition for the whole
compound.
4.3 Complex Sentences
Complex sentences are treated as follows. First the sentence is expanded
into a tableaux by application of the expansion rules. Then the composi-
tionality rules are applied to the resulting tableau in order to obtain the
presuppositions of the sentence.
Sentence (11) If John is married and he has children, then his children are
at school can act as an example. Assuming a logical form for this sentence
(α ∧ β)→ δβ, the tableau for this sentence would be:
3 Ordering does seem to play a role in the intuitive validity of conjunctions (There is
a typewriter and the typewriter is blue is acceptable, The typewriter is blue and there is a
typewriter is harder to accept). This issue is discussed further in [6].
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(α ∧ β)→ δβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬(α ∧ β) ¬(α ∧ β) α ∧ β
δβ ¬δβ δβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬α ¬α α
¬β β ¬β
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬α ¬α α
¬β β ¬β
︷︸︸︷
α
β
The presupposition rules applied to this tableau predict no presupposi-
tion. (Rule 1 fails for all branches).
4.4 Discourses
When logical statements of the type considered so far are strung into a se-
quence of assertions, a discourse is obtained. An appropriate treatment of
discourses is required to study the effect of context on presuppposition inter-
pretation. A discourse is represented by the tableaux for the set of formulas
in it.
A problematic case studied by Beaver [2] is based on example (9) above.
Suppose it is understood in the context that whenever Mary has a bath, she
uses up all the hot water. This can be represented by assuming that the
context already holds sentence (12) If Mary has had a bath, then there is no
hot water left, with a logical form α → β. A representation for the discourse
(12),(9) or α→ β, α→ δβ would be the following tableau:
α → β
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬α ¬α α
β ¬β β
α → δβ α → δβ α → δβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬α ¬α α
δβ ¬δβ δβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬α ¬α α
δβ ¬δβ δβ
︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬α ¬α α
δβ ¬δβ δβ
Over this representation it can be seen that the rules correctly predict no
presupposition for the discourse as a whole, even though sentence (9) on its
own did have a presupposition.
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4.5 Traditional Presuppositional Concepts in Terms of
Tableaux
The tableaux framework allows definition of some of the traditional concepts
that surround presupposition.
The presupposition φ of a presuppositional sentence δφ added to a tableau
Γ is satisfied if the tableau Γ ∪ {¬φ} is closed.
The presupposition φ of a presuppositional sentence δφ added to a tableau
Γ is canceled if the tableau Γ ∪ {φ} is closed.
These two definitions correspond to the intuitive concepts of satisfaction
and cancelation. However, it is clear that there will be cases when some
branches of a tableau are closed by φ and some by ¬φ. These hybrid cases
between satisfaction and cancelation escape the simpler analysis and give
rise to the need for projection rules. In their simplest manifestation, hybrid
cases occur as the traditional cases of problematic projection. These involve
sentences (4), (5) and (6) given above. More complex manifestations con-
cern discourses where the effect of context plays a role in the interpretation
of presupposition. The discourse constructed with sentences (12) and (9)
is an instance of these cases. In all these examples it holds that for any
of the tableau representations some branches of the tableau are closed by
the presupposition involved and some by its negation. Under those circum-
stances, the traditional definitions of satisfaction and/or cancelation could
not account for the resulting presuppositional behaviour.
The present framework achieves this by allowing presupposition to be
blocked locally by either β or ¬β (conditions 1.i and 1.ii ).
5 Critical Analyisis
5.1 Advantages over van der Sandt
The framework presented here is closely related to that proposed by van
der Sandt. Both can be interpreted as a branching structure for a sentence
based on the connective words that appear in it. The advantages of this
framework are that 1) it makes explicit the semantics that are attributed
to the connectives, and 2) logical consistency (both at sentence level and at
branch level) and logical consequence are explicitly taken into account in the
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5.2 Advantages over Beaver
The behaviour of all the connectives (including disjunction) is described satis-
factorily by the rules given. No specific rules for each connective are required.
The compositionality rules rely on the semantics in general terms. As a re-
sult, the same compositionality rules may be applied to other connectives
if their semantics can be represented in the same framework in a way that
preserves the Coverage Property.
The general approach that starts with Karttunen and leads to Beaver is
criticized for not being able to justify their choice of method for obtaining
presuppositions of compounds on grounds other than that it describes the be-
haviour. In the present framework the method is given simply by attributing
a weak informative status to presupposition (so that it is overridden whenever
it overlaps or conflicts with explicit information or other presuppositions).
5.3 Advantages over Mercer
In the present framework the information that Mercer must introduce as
pragmatic implicatures can be read off the representation. An expansion
rule like:
β1 ∨ β2
β1 ¬β1 β1
β2 β2 ¬β2
captures the idea that each of β1, ¬β1, β2 and ¬β2 is valid in at least one
of the possible alternatives given. This property of the present framework
is a direct result of the insistence on taking the semantics – as given by the
internal structure of the sentence in terms of connectives – into account.
The method followed by the compositional rules is quite close to Gazdar’s
method for computing presuppositions simply in terms of consistency with
the context. However, it presents two major innovations: 1) it allows both
satisfaction and cancelation (presuppositions disappear when inconsistent
and/or when already present), and 2) it applies the procedure locally. The
combination of these two innovations allows adequate treatment of hybrid
cases.
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6 Conclusions
Presuppositional behaviour in sentences can be described in relation to the
implicit logical structure represented by the appearance of natural language
connectives if . . . then , and , and or in the sentences to be interpreted.
The framework presented here provides a method for determining the
behaviour of presuppositions of complex logical statements in a compositional
manner.
The predictions of the proposed method match the observed behaviour
in traditional examples.
The semantics used in the present framework are chosen to ensure that all
the different valid alternatives implied by a sentence are listed explicitly in
a tableau for that sentence, and all atomic formulas involved appear (either
negated or not) in every branch (Coverage Property). These constraints on
the semantics allow all the predictions of the framework to be explained in
terms of two basic assumptions: presuppositions are only considered infor-
mative where they do not overlap with or contradict asserted information,
and where they do not conflict with other presuppositions.
There are some problems left unsolved. The present framework covers
both information explicitly represented in the logic and presuppositional in-
formation, but does not allow a unified treatment; and it does not address the
defeasible nature of certain presuppositions. In Gerva´s [6], these problems
are addressed by providing tableau expansion rules for presupposition. This
makes presuppositional information explicit in the framework. Because the
issue of defeasibility is closely related to consistency checking, the framework
proposed here presents advantages for this purpose by having the semantics
of each connective made fully explicit.
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